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Abstract
The Internet is quickly changing the way business-to-consumer and business-to-
business commerce is conducted in the world.  The Electronic Revolution has also
spawned a trend of price wars and, in some instances, chaos because of the zero-sum
nature of the electronic channel.  The technology has created an opportunity to get
beyond the lose-lose nature of single issue price wars by determining sellers’ and
buyers’ preferences across multiple issues and encouraging negotiations, thereby
creating possible joint gains for all parties.  We develop simple multiple issue
algorithms and heuristics that could be used in electronic auctions and electronic
markets, to match businesses to businesses and consumers based on dovetailing
underlying interests and preferences.  We provide arguments that such dovetailed
matches should help stabilize markets and make them more efficient.
Keywords:  Decision Support; Negotiation Modeling; World-Wide-Web; Electronic
Commerce, Computer-mediated Communication, Multiple Criteria Decision Making,
Intelligent Agents, Bots.
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1.  Introduction
In order to put our study into perspective, we present a market framework adapted from
Guttman and Maes (1998b) (Figure 1). The market framework consists of one or many
buyers and one or many sellers. One buyer and one seller, assuming the current
tendency towards non-fixed prices, defines a traditional negotiation. The negotiation
may take place face-to-face or electronically. One seller and many buyers defines an
auction which may be live or on-line. Many sellers and one buyer defines a reverse
auction, an example being a government auction. Many sellers and many buyers defines
a market or a double auction, which may be live or electronic. Live and electronic
versions of stock exchanges exist. Guttman and Maes (1998b) also differentiate between
traditional classified ad markets and traditional stock markets, the difference being that
in traditional stock markets there is a centralized multilateral exchange compared to
classified ad markets, where trading is ad hoc and bilateral. Centralized multilateral
exchange markets may become classified ad markets and vice versa due to
revolutionary changes made possible through the Internet and the expansion of the
world-wide-web for electronic commerce. An example of a previously classified ad
market, which is becoming an exchange market, is the US home mortgage market.
Traditional retail markets may offer an opposite example. Such markets are becoming
more one-to-one, exhibiting features similar to classified ad markets (e.g. Egghead and
Dell Computer). Some traditional markets and auctions offer the possibility of trading
both electronically or live. Even the traditional large stock exchanges are moving in the
direction of partially electronic markets.
Most existing live and electronic auctions and markets mainly focus on a single issue,
namely price of the merchandise or stock (Guttman and Maes, 1998b). There exists
extensive literature demonstrating the detrimental effects of single issue, distributive
(zero-sum) negotiations. Price wars are a concrete example, leading to a volatile market
(Burdett and Coles, 1997; Kephart et al., 1998; Guttman, Moukas, and Maes, 1998;
Anders, 1998). Exclusive focus on price will also do a disservice to buyers and sellers
alike by hiding important value attributes from consideration. Following Guttman and
2Maes (1998a), an explicit consideration of such multiple value attributes holds the
promise of converting distributive negotiations into integrative negotiations. See also
Kersten and Szpakowicz (1998).
  BUYERS
                                                            ONE MANY
ONE    NEGOTIATION           AUCTION
SELLERS
MANY   REVERSE AUCTION               MARKETS
Figure 1:  Market Framework
In this paper we develop simple, heuristic algorithms for multiple issue electronic
markets and auctions, to match businesses with businesses and consumers based on
dovetailing buyers’ and sellers’ underlying interests and preferences. We argue that
such dovetailed matches should help stabilize markets and make them more efficient.
To the best of our knowledge, there is very little literature on multiple issue markets and
auctions whether electronic or live. See, for example, Kagel and Roth (1995, pp. 416-
421). When discussing auctions, we focus on auctioning a single good having multiple
negotiable attributes/issues or multiple quantities of homogeneous goods, such as
stocks. When discussing markets, we focus on the case of multiple diametrically
opposed issues as well as the case where quantity is a negotiable issue. A web site that
runs the algorithms acts as the exchange mechanism.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review the
relevant literature. In section 3 we discuss some theory of multiple issue markets and
auctions; in section 4, auction algorithms and in section 5 market algorithms. Section 6
concludes the paper.
2.  Literature Overview
We classify the literature into Electronic Negotiation Models,  Automated Agents,
Auctions, and Markets. The literature is vast and draws upon Economics, Finance,
Information Sciences, Marketing, and Negotiation Science, among others. We focus on
the recent electronic applications of auctions and markets and also provide some
representative web site URLs. In many instances, the developments have been so rapid
that the academic journals are lagging behind and many of the applications and
publications can only be found on the WWW.
3Different aspects of Electronic Commerce have been relatively well documented,
although the research in the area is very active (Choi, Staahl and Whinston, 1997;
Peterson et al., 1997; Baty and Lee, 1995; Lee and Clark, 1996; Elofson and Robinson,
1998; Barua et al., 1997). FastParts and GE’s TPN provide good examples of business
to business Electronic Commerce websites. See the reference list for URLs. The
dramatic expansion and ease of Electronic Commerce will make electronic markets and
auctions common. Obviously it is not unimportant how such electronic markets and
auctions are conducted.
Electronic Negotiation Models
Computer aided negotiation support models have been developed to provide analytical
aid to negotiators, both as individuals and  groups (see, e.g., Teich et al. 1995, 1996).
Research in the area of negotiation modeling has been quite active within the last two
decades.  For a review of the literature see Teich, Wallenius and Wallenius (1994,
1998).  Kersten’s site is representative of the current state of the art in electronic
negotiations.   Kersten’s site is among the first web-based negotiation support sites and
includes the possibility for asynchronous negotiations (Kersten and Noronha, 1997).
Segev’s site provides an extensive list of references and links.
Automated Agents
In recent years Artificial Intelligence researchers have created several software agents
that aid in web browsing, searching, shopping, negotiating and other internet related
tasks (see, e.g., Doorenbos, Etzioni, Weld, 1997; Sandholm and Lesser, 1995;
Barbuceanu and Fox, 1997; Moukas and Zacharia, 1997; Oliver, 1997; Khoo et al.,
1998; BotSpot).  The web portal Excite’s Jango (developed by Doorenbos, Etzioni and
Weld), a shopping agent,  is probably the biggest commercial success thus far of agent
technology.  This agent, and others, however concentrate on finding the lowest price
among merchants offering a specific product or service, as discussed in the introduction.
MIT Media Lab’s forthcoming site T@T promises to be an exception, offering agent
technology and Distributed Constraint Satisfaction Problem protocols to aid the
multiple issue/attribute choice problem (Moukas, Guttman and Maes, 1998).  Their
earlier generation Kasbah site offered automated negotiation utilizing different
negotiation strategies over a single issue, price.  The first generation shopping agents
are already being used in some of the auction sites (e.g. Bid4It and AuctionBot).
Auctions
The most common types of auctions are the open English auction (ascending price), the
open Dutch auction (descending price), the closed Sealed bid auctions (1st or 2nd price,
the latter also known as Vickery auction). Other more complicated auctions are the
Double auction (multiple buyers and sellers), Multi-unit auctions, such as the open
English clock auction, the Combinatorial auction, which permits bids on groups of
assets, and the Reverse or Procurement auction. Some of these auctions may be
conducted as closed or as open auctions, simultaneous or sequential. There is extensive
literature which discusses and tests these auctions using multiple performance measures,
including revenue equivalence, the extent of price discrimination, and the efficiency of
4auctions (Kagel and Roth, 1995; Smith, 1991; Rothkopf et al., 1995; McAfee and
McMillan, 1987 and 1996; Milgrom, 1989; Rothkopf and Harstad, 1994; Ashenfelter,
1989; Feldman and Mehra, 1993a, 1993b; Hausch, 1986; Rothkopf et al., 1986;
McCabe, Rassenti, Smith, 1990 and 1991a, 1991b; Cox, Smith and Walker, 1984;
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1988; Tenorio, 1993; Roth’s site includes links to literature). The
auctions listed above are single-issue (price) auctions, with the exceptions of Multi-unit
auctions (price and quantity) and Combinatorial auctions (groupings of assets).
Web-based electronic auctions have recently become very popular. For a review, see
Wurman, Walsh, and Wellman (1998) and Wellman and Wurman (1998). As discussed
by Schwartz (1998), hundreds of different types of electronic auctions exist. Design
features include whether or not sellers specify reservation prices, whether there is
automatic bidding (for example AuctionBot, Kasbah, Bid4it), whether bidders rate each
other via blacklists, when the auctions close and rules regarding the closing, the type of
merchandise (new, used) and the quantities offered (one or multiple), whether we have a
regular or reverse/procurement auction (see Freemarkets and Priceline). Priceline is a
type of reverse auction for unused capacity on airlines -- being extended for
automobiles and home mortgages, where bidders (with a credit card commitment)
“name their price” (Walker, Schneier, Jorasch, 1996).
Markets
Our market framework differentiates between auctions and markets. Yet, in practice
there is an overlapping area, specifically referred to in the auction literature as double
auctions. Such double auctions serve many buyers and sellers. In fact, the continuous
double auction is probably the oldest practiced type of market exchange of goods and
stocks, where buyers and sellers post their bids/asks continuously and transactions occur
when they overlap, resulting in price discrimination throughout the trading day. A
popular competing market is known as the Call market (AKA single price auction),
where the auctioneer/marketer balances the supply and the demand and determines a
single price at which all goods are exchanged at that uniform price during the trading
day. Matching is an important aspect to some markets, especially the more complicated
ones (Roth and Oliveira, 1990; Mongell and Roth, 1991; Foner, 1997; Kallio and Salo,
1993).
Dissatisfaction with the high costs of using intermediaries when trading on organized
exchanges has contributed to the development of electronic markets, either web-based
or non web-based. These costs include direct costs in terms of commissions paid to
brokers and indirect costs, such as market impact, where high volume trades result in
higher/lower trading prices. In particular, large institutional investors are highly
motivated to avoid the indirect costs of market impact. See, for example, Angel et al.
(1997), Lupien and Rickard (1997), Schwartz (1991). This has led to the development
of what are known as electronic fourth markets, such as Instinet and POSIT (Portfolio
System for Institutional Trading), and the more recent web-based electronic markets. As
examples of web-based electronic markets, see the Arizona Stock Exchange (a call
market), band-X (a classified ad market for the exchange of bandwidth), FastParts (a
market for electronic components), and GE’s TPN (a market for components).
5Case of Optimark
Similar to Instinet and POSIT, Optimark is an electronic stock exchange market,
developed for institutional traders.  Even though the market is not web-based nor
currently in operation (Optimark is cooperating with both the Pacific Exchange, set to
begin Fall, 1998 and NASDAQ scheduled for 1999), we will discuss it more in-depth
because it is the only multiple (2) issue market we are aware that exists.  Those two
issues being price of stock and quantity traded.  Again, the motivation is to reduce the
market impact of large institutional trades by encouraging traders to state preferences
across ranges of price and size.  These preferences are stated anonymously, hence
eliminating the market impact phenomenon, yet still matching buyers and sellers.  Such
large traders may be willing to accept a higher or lower price than the current market
price for such large volumes of trades.  See Lupian and Rickard (1997) (IBM provides
the patent at their site) and Optimark’s site.  In economic terms, they try to eliminate the
shifts of demand or supply curves when new buyers/sellers enter or exit the market.
Whether Optimark will be successful in eliminating the market impact, stabilizing
markets and reducing price volatility remains to be seen.
We have reproduced three figures from Optimark’s web site and explain their electronic
market system based on those.  See Figures 2, 3, 4.  In Figure 2, one buyer’s satisfaction
density profile (based on the buyer’s underlying value function) is exhibited.
Lupian and Rickard (1997) use the following notation.  There are M buyers and N
sellers.  The size/price combinations are assigned a satisfaction value ranging from 0 to
1;   a value of 0 indicates unwillingness to trade at that price/size combination;  a value
of 1 indicates the highest level of satisfaction.  Only discrete levels of type .1, .2, .3 etc.
are allowed, higher values indicating higher levels of preference for that price/size trade.
Every trader is required to indicate his/her satisfaction profiles for each stock he/she
wants to trade,  using the 0 to 1 scale, however the actual detail and accuracy will vary
from trader to trader.  The satisfaction density profiles are defined as Bi(p,s) for buyer i
and Sk(p,s) for seller k where p is price and s is quantity of stock.
Optimark then matches buyers and sellers based on a two-stage system. Figure 3
explains the aggregation procedure, which is the first stage.  Starting with the size/price
cells containing a value “1” (for both buyer and seller), the algorithm attempts to match
traders by combining/aggregating  smaller quantity traders to larger quantity traders at a
single price. In the second stage, in Figure 4, for remaining buyer-seller combinations, a
“mutual satisfaction density profile value” is calculated by multiplying the individual
satisfaction density profiles.  They define the mutual satisfaction density profile
between the ith buyer and the kth seller to be
Jik(p,s) = Bi(p,s)Sk(p,s),  i = 1,…, M;  k = 1,…,N.
6Figure 2  Optimark: Buyer’s Satisfaction Density Profile
Source:  www.optimark.com
Figure 3 Optimark  Aggregation Stage
Source: www.optimark.com
7Figure 4 Optimark Cross Products in Stage 2
Source: www.optimark.com
The matching is based on the ranked list of MN cross products for all price/size cells,
the maximum of which is basically a Nash Bargaining Solution. Optimark is planning to
match buyers and sellers every 90 seconds.  In case of ties, five rules exist to break
them.1
3. Multiple Issue Markets and Auctions: Some Theory
Quantity is not an issue
Figure 5a presents contract curves for a two-issue market/auction example, where there
exists one seller and three potential buyers.  When dealing with multiple issues in
auctions and markets, in a diametrically opposed issue space, some matches of buyers
and sellers make more sense than others because of dovetailing underlying values.  If
we map the contract curves from Figure 5a to the utility space, we obtain Figure 5b.
The result is the three Pareto frontiers from which no joint gains are possible for that
individual buyer/seller pair.  The Anti-Pareto frontier is defined as the lower bound of
the feasible region in the utility space.  One such frontier for buyer1/seller, from which
no joint losses are possible, is represented in the figure.  Of course, Anti-Pareto frontiers
exist for the other buyer/seller combinations as well, but are not depicted in the figure.
Assuming all individual “value points” derived from the buyers’ and seller’s value
functions were known as would be the case in experimental settings (computer
simulations or human experiments), we could make the following argument.  From the
                                                
1
 Ties are broken by a series of rules that correspond to conventional notions of fairness in
trading. The priority for allocations is basically in the following (nested) order: 1) mutual
preference value;  2) "standing" status of the profile pair;  3) "class" status of the profile pair;  4)
times of entry of the profile pair; 5) trade size within the same pair of profiles; and 6) price, in
favor of the earlier submitted profile, in the event all of the above are tied. “Standing” refers to
the willingness of a trader to accept any partial fill out to some maximum amount, at a particular
price. “Class” refers to the regulatory status of the trader (we use four classes in the U.S.
system, i.e., book, agency, principal, and away market quote).  Time of entry, size, and price are
self-explanatory.  (Source: Private communication from Optimark President, Dr. T. Rickard.)
8seller’s point of view it would make sense to match him with buyer 2 for lower levels of
Issue 1 and Issue 2 and with buyer 3 for higher levels of Issue 1 and Issue 2.  This is
what we call  the “Super Pareto Frontier” consisting of the  most northeasterly segments
of the combined  contract curves.  In reality, we would not know the value points and
we need algorithms to match buyers and sellers based on underlying dovetailed
interests.  Even without the value points, and considering the problem of interpersonal
comparison of utilities, the inward or outward bulging shape of the utility curves could
facilitate the identification of good matches and the concession making process in the
issue space.  The reason being that for outward bulging utility curves, a large concession
in issue space may result in a small decrement of utility.  For inward bulging utility
curves the opposite is true (see Mumpower, 1991).  We are not advocating the
automatic matching of Seller with Buyers on the Super Pareto frontier.  We expect the
seller to be individually rational and negotiate with the buyer with whom he/she can
receive the highest utility, and that could be Buyer 1 in Figure 5b and hence a Super
Pareto solution would not be attained.  Therefore the concept of “good matches” and
“dovetailing interests” may not always be useful in real situations because it depends on
the trader’s BATNAs (Best Alternative To a Negotiated Agreement) and power, among
others
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Figure 5a.   Contract Curves for a Multiple Issue Market Example:
        One Seller and Three Potential Buyers
        in a Diametrically Opposed Issue Space
Seller’s Preferred Point
Buyer’s Preferred Point
Buyer 1 / Seller Curve
Buyer 2 / Seller Curve
Buyer 3 / Seller Curve
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Figure 5b.   Super Pareto Frontier in Utility Space
        for Figure 5a Example 
Anti-Pareto Frontier
Buyer1 / Seller
Pareto Frontier Buyer 1 / Seller
Pareto Frontier Buyer 2 / Seller
Pareto Frontier Buyer 3 / Seller
Super Pareto Frontier
Quantity is an issue
In a multiple issue market, when quantity is an issue, value is a function of both quantity
AND price, among others. The value functions of groups of sellers and buyers result in
indifference curves in the multiple issue space. These can then be viewed as a type of
Edgeworth Box forming a contract curve at the tangency points of the indifference
curves.  This concept is demonstrated in a two issue (price/quantity) example in Figure
6.  A single point on the contract curve will be implicitly “negotiated” by market
participants.  Exactly where this negotiated point is on the curve is indeterminate, but
will be converged upon (at least with an efficient market mechanism) by market forces.
In a seller’s market, a point in the upper right-hand-side of the curve will be converged
upon, in a buyer’s market, a point in the lower right. In a simulated market with defined
value functions, a researcher could determine whether the resulting trade agreement lies
on this contract curve (which would be Pareto Optimal) or off it.
10
4.  Multiple Issue Auction Algorithms
Quantity is not an issue
Figure 7 illustrates the Leap Frog Method where bidders determine the path of bids.
This is a natural extension of a typical single issue English auction where bidders shout
out their bids.  Each bid must be an improvement over the previous bid in at least one of
the issues and no worse in any of the issues.  We cannot advocate this method because
the path is somewhat arbitrarily determined and it does not consider the preference of
the auction maker at all.
In Figure 8, we describe an Auction Maker Controlled Bid Mechanism, which could be
used in either a regular auction (single seller) or a reverse auction (single buyer).  In
Figure 8 we represent a preference path for a seller in a situation where the seller and
the  buyers are diametrically opposed in a two issue space. The preference path is
determined as follows:  the seller  rank orders his/her most important jumps from his/her
nadir (worst) point for issues that are "discretized".  By discretized issues we mean
continuous issues that have been given a set of discrete levels.  If an issue already has a
set of discrete levels, we could use those. The ranking process continues until all levels
of each issue have an associated rank.  The ranks determine the preference path for the
Price / share
Quantity
Figure 6.   Contract Curve for Groups
      of Sellers and Buyers
Neutral
Market
Sellers’ Market
Buyers’ Market
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seller and the path then in which the bidders would follow.  If desired, the auction
maker could provide the auctioneer (or computer) with a reservation level below which
a bid is not accepted.  We anticipate this method will be preferred by the sellers, and the
result will be more efficient than the result with the leap frog method.
Quantity is an issue
We propose a discriminative auction for the multi-unit case in a computerized web
environment.  The advantage to the seller is that revenue should be maximized
(although this needs to be verified), and the advantage to the buyer is that the bid
required to enter the “action” is posted while keeping the actual bids sealed.  We
speculate bidders will appreciate the additional information. By allowing some degree
of price discrimination, but less than in a typical discriminative auction, the “winners
curse” effect can be reduced, thus encouraging active bidding.
% of issue 2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of issue 1
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
bid 3
bid 2
bid n
initial bid
Figure 7.   Leap Frog Method: 
                 Bidders Determine Path
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Let us next introduce some terminology and notation. An active bid is one, which
would be accepted at that price and quantity, if the auction were to close at that point in
time.  An inactive bid is one that has expired because it was outbid.  A semi-active bid
is one in which the bidder will only receive a partial quantity if the auction closed at that
point in time. Our algorithm assumes that bidders will accept partial quantities, if their
bid is semi-active.
Si = (pi, qi), is the bid of bidder i, where pi = per  unit price for bidder i, and qi = quantity
desired by bidder i, (i = 1, … , n);
n = number of bidders;
D = number of units for sale;
t = iteration counter;
spt  = suggested price at iteration t.
The steps of the multiple unit discriminative auction algorithm are as follows:
Step 1. Auction owner specifies quantity for sale D, reservation prices, the closing
time of the auction, and the minimum increment in bids (epsilon).
Step 2. Bidder i enters auction by specifying a desired quantity qi .
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Figure 8.   Auction Maker Specified Path
Reservation Level
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Step 3.  Bidders request a price.  The suggested price spt is either at the reservation level
if supply has not yet depleted, or at the previous level, or is calculated an
epsilon amount above the previous price.  The determination is based on
whether total demand at that price can be met by the supply. If so, the price
remains the same as previously; if not, it is increased by an epsilon amount.
Step 4.  Bidders submit their bid Si either at the level suggested by the algorithm, or
above that level, or they drop out.  Bids below the suggested level are not
accepted.
Step 5. Bidders whose status changes are informed and requested to make a decision.
Go to step 2.  Repeat until auction closes.
The revenue, increasing at every iteration, is calculated as follows:
.0q  otherwise ,Dq q  iff qDq
:is jbidder  active-semifor quantity  residual  The   bidders. active   theare 
n , ... , 1j bidder; active-semi  the torefers j where,pqqpvenueReTotal
jrj
n
1ji
i
n
1ji
ijr
jjr
n
1ji
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=>+−=
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∑∑
∑
+=+=
+=
As an example, assume a seller has 100 units of a homogenous good to auction, with a
reservation price of $1 per unit, and epsilon is 5%.  At time 1, Bidder 1 enters the
auction, specifies a quantity of 50 and requests a price from the auction mechanism.
Since there are no other bids, the reservation price is suggested to the bidder.  He makes
his bid (1, 50) and it becomes active in status.  At time 2, Bidder 2 enters, specifies a
quantity of 40 and requests a price.  Again the reservation price of $1 is suggested,
because the supply has not yet been depleted.  Bidder 2 makes his bid (1, 40) and it
becomes active in status. At time 3, bidder 3 enters the auction, and specifies a quantity
of 30. At this point the supply is depleted and a new price must be calculated.  The
auction mechanism calculates a price an epsilon percentage (5%) above the latest price,
and a price of $1.05 is suggested to the bidder.  He then makes his bid (1.05, 30).
Bidder two then is outbid and thus becomes semi-active with a quantity of 20 units,
because he was the last one to bid at the price of $1.  Bidder one remains active.  At
time 4, bidder two has three options.  He can withdraw from the auction completely,
stay semi-active in status, or re-bid.  Assume he decides to re-bid at the same quantity of
40 units, and requests a price.  The price $1.05 is suggested by the mechanism because
at that price the quantities of bidders 2 and 3 would be met by the supply.  Bidder 2 then
makes his bid (1.05, 40).  Bidder 3 remains active in status and bidder 1 becomes semi-
active with a quantity of 30 units.  At time 5, bidder 1 has, again, three options, i.e.
withdraw, remain semi-active or re-bid.  Assume he decides to re-bid and requests a
price.  The mechanism then returns a price of $1.1025 because at $1.05 the demand is
greater than the supply.  Therefore the new price must be calculated at 5% above the
most recent price suggested (of $1.05).  If he makes this bid (1.1025, 50), he will
become active in status, bidder 3 will remain active, and bidder 2 will become semi-
active with a quantity of 20.  The process repeats until the auction closes.  See Figure 9
for status and positions at the close and the following table for the sequence of the bids.
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time     bidder/bid#      q          p      .
1    1/1 50 1
2    2/1 40 1
3    3/1 30 1.05
4    2/2 40 1.05
5    1/2 50 1.1025
Prior to the auction, the seller has the right to set a reservation price.  This reservation
price could refer to the total minimum revenue generated from the auction, or he/she
could use multiple reservation prices for different quantities.  For example, he/she could
specify that for quantities between 1 and 10 units the reservation price is, say, $100 per
unit, and for quantities above 10 the reservation price per unit is $90.
In our algorithm, the price discrimination is reduced to an epsilon difference if the
bidders accept the suggested bid.  If, however they bid above the suggested bid, then,
the price discrimination level could be higher.  Why would a bidder be willing to pay
above the suggested price level?  This could happen if the bidder wants to decrease the
probability of being outbid.  If an automatic bidding mechanism is used, then the bidder
could specify the top price to bid at his quantity, and the mechanism would
automatically re-bid on his behalf up to that point. Beyond that point, he could specify a
reduced quantity up to another level and so on.
Price ($)
Quantity (Units)
1.30
1.25
1.20
1.15
1.10
1.05
1.00
0.95
0.90
0.85
Figure 9.   Price/Quantity Auction Example
Key: BA = Bid Active
         BS = Bid Semi-active
         BI =  Bid Inactive
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5.  Multiple Issue Market Algorithms
Quantity is an issue
Optimark’s two issue market algorithm is novel and is gaining momentum among
practitioners. Optimark’s training institute has taught over 2000 traders to use their
forthcoming system. It does have several appealing features: anonymity, possible
elimination of market impact, preference elicitation over two issues, and the aggregation
of small trades matched with larger quantities. However, we do have some criticisms
towards the algorithm, which we wish to discuss. We also provide some suggestions for
improving the preference elicitation and the matching.
Optimark allows price discrimination, that is trading same stocks at the same time at
different prices (possibly opening arbitrage opportunities). Optimark accepts price
discrimination, because it allows greater quantities to be traded -- a feature Optimark
and apparently their customers see desirable. Since their system is ‘black box’, the level
of price discrimination will go unreported. Hence the level of price discrimination could
be larger with Optimark contrasted with traditional stock exchange trading. “Winners
curse” is avoided because no one knows they have been “cursed”.  Ignorance may be
bliss in this case.
We are also critical of the 0, .1, .2,  ... , .9, 1 preference elicitation scale. Optimark
explains that a 0 means unwillingness to trade and a 1 means total satisfaction with the
trade. Scores in between differentiate between levels of preference. This seems to be too
complicated to be done every 90 seconds, even though Optimark counters that traders
can input preference scores as quick/dirty as they desire and yet still obtain desirable
trades. We question why anyone would be willing to furnish preference scores between
0 and 1 with their system and are concerned that traders do not specify a unique single
best ‘1’ cell. Furthermore, some traders may be more skillful than others in strategically
manipulating scores to gain advantage (arbitrage?) over other traders. Obviously
values/preference scores cannot be compared across people. As discussed below, our
suggestion is to use a cruder scale.
Even if traders shared the same preference scale and accurately portrayed it, ranking the
cells based on the product of preference scores, is arbitrary. See Table 1, where we have
reproduced the possible Optimark cross products. For example, the product of .6 and .6
is the same as .4 and .9. Nash and Optimark treat the cells as equally good. Subjectively,
we would argue that .6 times .6  would be a better match (assuming that .6 means the
same for both traders). Similarly, Optimark’s matching algorithm would prefer .5 times
1 to .7 times .7. Again, we would argue that the latter would be a better match. For a
criticism of the use of the Nash bargaining solution in negotiation literature, see Raiffa
(1982).
In Tables 2 and 3 we have calculated cross products associated with two simple
preference elicitation schemes. Table 2 is based on a 0-4 scheme and Table 3 on an even
simpler 0-2 scheme. In the 0-4 scheme a trader will only specify a single ‘4’ value, as
well as at most a single ‘2’ value.
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Table 1: Optimark Cross Product Scores
1.00 0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
0.90 0.00 0.09 0.18 0.27 0.36 0.45 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.81 0.90
0.80 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.24 0.32 0.40 0.48 0.56 0.64 0.72 0.80
0.70 0.00 0.07 0.14 0.21 0.28 0.35 0.42 0.49 0.56 0.63 0.70
0.60 0.00 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.24 0.30 0.36 0.42 0.48 0.54 0.60
Buyer Profile 0.50 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30 0.35 0.40 0.45 0.50
0.40 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.12 0.16 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.32 0.36 0.40
0.30 0.00 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.21 0.24 0.27 0.30
0.20 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20
0.10 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.10
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0.00 0.10 0.20 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 0.70 0.80 0.90 1.00
Seller Profile
Likewise, in the 0-2 scheme a trader would specify only a single ‘2’ value. The 0-4 and
the 0-2 scales are quick and dirty and fairly easy to specify. In both of these scales, the
maximum of the minimum scores is the same as the maximum of the cross products,
which is untrue in the original Optimark scheme, as demonstrated above. Raiffa (1996)
argues that the max-min rule may be more fair than the max cross product rule. This
perceived benefit comes with the additional cost of an increased number of ties, which
must be resolved one way or another.
TABLE 2. Modified  0-4 Point Scheme: Cross Products
4 0 4 8 12 16
3 0 3 6 9 12
2 0 2 4 6 8
Buyer Profile 1 0 1 2 3 4
0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 2 3 4
Seller Profile
Key: 4 best of threes, 3 happy with trade, 2 best of ones, 1 willing to trade, 0 not willing
to trade.
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        TABLE 3. Modified  0-2 point scheme: Cross Products
2 0 2 4
Buyer Profile 1 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
0 1 2
Seller Profile
Key: 2 Best, 1 will trade, 0 no trade
In both the 0-4 scheme and the 0-2 scheme, there are two phases in the matching
process:
phase 1:  Find  the cross products (the same as in  OptiMark) and match the ranked list.
phase 2.  There will be ties, especially on the “one” cross products.  We describe below
three possible tie breaker rules.  Our description is specifically tailored for the
0-2 scheme (see, for example, Figure 10a and 10b), however with slight
modification they could also be applied to the 0-4 scheme.
P / share
Q (100000 shares)
55
50
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 10a.   Seller’s Preference Profile
         in 2-1-0 Method Example
2 = seller’s most preferred point
1 = willing to trade
0 = not willing to trade
18
Idea A (B) tie breaker: Count the number of ties for each pair. Start matching based on
the LARGEST (SMALLEST) number of ties (1s most likely). For each matching pair,
draw a line between the 2s (most preferred points). Mark the tied region. See Figure
10c. If the line passes through the marked region, select the cell where the midpoint of
the line segment passing through the marked region is located. If the line does not pass
through the marked region, then select the cell that is closest to the overall midpoint of
the line connecting the two best cells.  See Figure 10d.
Idea C:  Force the matches which simply maximize quantity of shares traded.   The true
maximum quantity would be computationally difficult to calculate with a large number
of tied traders (a combinatorial/maximum flow network problem). Therefore, we
suggest a greedy heuristic approach to approximate this maximum quantity.  For all tied
traders, first calculate the maximum quantity for each paired buyer/seller combination.
Match the buyer/seller whose quantity is highest (in case of no unique price, split the
difference in price), delete that pair and repeat until all feasible pairs have been
matched.
Which of these ideas performs best awaits further testing and analysis as well as
thorough comparison to the operation of Optimark’s algorithm.
P / share
Q (100000 shares)
55
50
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 0 0
Figure 10b.   Buyer’s Preference Profile
         in 2-1-0 Method Example
2 = buyer’s most preferred point
1 = willing to trade
0 = not willing to trade
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P / share
Q (100000 shares)
55
50
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 x
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 x 0 0 0 0
Figure 10c.   Cross Products of Buyer/Seller Profiles From
         Figures 10a and 10b: Line Crosses Region of ‘1s’
mid-point of line segment: 
trade at this quantity and price
Sellers’ best
Buyers’ best
P / share
Q (100000 shares)
55
50
45
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Figure 10d.   Cross Products of Buyer/Seller Profiles: 
         Line Does Not Cross Region of ‘1s’
Sellers’ best
Buyers’ best
mid-point of whole line segment
x
x
1 1 1
1 1
1
trade at this quantity and price
minimum distance from mid-point to region ‘1’ cells
 (  s res)
: 
llers’ st
 t
i - i t f l  li  s e t
i i  ist  fr  i - i t t  re i  ‘ ’ cells
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Quantity is Not an Issue
In Figure 11, we present the preference paths for three buyers and one seller who are
diametrically opposed in a two issue space (see also Korhonen et al., 1995).   As
explained in the Auction Section above, the preference paths are determined  by having
each party rank order the most important jumps from their nadir (worst) point for issues
that are "discretized". The ranks determine the preference path for each trader.  The
traders could specify their reservation levels on their preference path if desired. We
match sellers and buyers based on their “closeness” of the path and suggest they
negotiate with that party.  If they have specified their reservation level on that path, we
can check if there is an overlap and a possible agreement zone. If a match occurs, we
inform the two parties and they close the deal.
A word of explanation regarding the definition of closeness and why closeness is
desirable is in order.  If a buyer’s and seller’s preference paths overlap completely, this
implies that there is complete dovetailing interests.  In other words, what one party
desires most, the other party desires least.  On the other extreme, if preference paths are
completely divergent, then there is no dovetailing interests, meaning both parties desire
the same things.  Geometrically a simple measure of closeness of two preference paths
is the area between the paths.  In higher dimensions this concept is more difficult to
operationalize.  Instead we recommend that we base the measure of closeness on the
distance between the coordinates of the points on the paths.
In case the participating sellers and buyers agree, we could automate the matching based
on minimum distance and overlapping reservation levels and select a settlement point.
One settlement option could be the midpoint of the overlapping reservation levels.  If
the sellers and buyers don’t agree to automate, we would simply notify the participants
of a close match and allow them to negotiate.
% of issue 2
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
% of issue 1
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
Figure 11   Preference Paths for Four Parties
        in Figure 5a Example
Seller’s Preferred Point
Buyer’s Preferred Point
Buyer 1
Buyer 2
Buyer 3
Seller
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The closer the paths, the better the match. Of course, if reservation levels are specified
and overlap, then the agreement zone exists. Even if a good match exists, reservation
levels may not overlap.  The reverse is also possible, in other words, bad matches may
have overlapping reservation levels.
6. Concluding Discussion
In this paper we have presented and discussed several multiple issue auction and market
algorithms. Much literature exists that discusses auctions and markets. However, very
few mention multiple issue auctions and markets and few algorithms and procedures
exist for such situations.  To compare and contrast such algorithms in an experimental
setting, a number of performance measures could be utilized.  They mostly relate to the
quantity or value of goods traded, and stability and efficiency of trades. Quantity and
value of goods traded is self explanatory.  One common  measure of efficiency of
markets is the percentage of the maximum possible gains from trade which is realized
by the allocation process. It is computed as the sum total of consumer surplus and
producer surplus divided by total possible sum. A traditional measure of stability is the
Nash Equilibrium. Pareto Optimality of realized trades is of particular interest in
multiple issue markets because of the potential of logrolling and generating joint gains.
Our future work includes experimentation with human subjects and computer
simulation of various algorithms and their impact on markets and auctions under
controlled experimental settings. We are in the process of implementing the algorithms
to the web environment. The aim is to improve the performance of auctions and markets
by matching consumers and producers based on their underlying preferences and
dovetailing interests. Such matching will reduce the likelihood of damaging price wars
and increase the satisfaction of the traders.
References
URLs:
 AuctionBot: http://auction.eecs.umich.edu/
Arizona Stock Exchange: www.azx.com
Band-X:  www.Band-X.com
Bid4it: www.bid4it.com
BotSpot:  botspot.com
FastParts www.fastparts.com
Freemarkets: www.freemarkets.com
GE’s TPN:  www.geic.tpn.com
IBM Patent site: http://www.patents.ibm.com/
Jango:  www.jango.com
Kasbah:  kasbah.media.mit.edu
Kersten’s site: http://interneg.carleton.ca/
22
Optimark: www.optimark.com and www.hipermarkets.com
Roth’s site: http://www.pitt.edu/~alroth/alroth.html#vshort
Priceline:  www.priceline.com
Segev’s site: http://haas.berkeley.edu/~citm/nego/nego-frames.html
T@T: http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/tete-a-tete/index.html
Publications:
Anders, G. (1998) “The Big Internet Challenge”,  Wall Street Journal, July 23, 1998.
Angel, J. J., Gastineau, G. I, and Weber, C. J. (1997) “Reducing the Market Impact of
Large Stock Trades”, Journal of Portfolio Management  Fall:69-76.
 Ashenfelter, Orley (1989) “How Auctions Work for Wine and Art”, Journal of
Economic Perspectives 3:23-36.
Barua, A., Ravindran, S. and Whinston, A. B. (1997) “Efficient Selection of Suppliers
over the Internet”, Journal of Management Information Systems 13:117-127.
Barbuceanu, M. and Fox, M. S. (1997) “Integrating Communicative Action,
Conversations and Decision Theory to Coordinate Agents”, Proceedings of the First
International Conference on Autonomous Agents, Agents 97, Marina Del Rey, ACM.
Baty, J. B. and Lee, R. M. (1995) “InterShop: Enhancing the Vendor/Customer
Dialectic in Electronic Shopping”, Journal of Management Information Systems  11:9-
19.
Burdett, K. and Coles, M. G. (1997) “Steady State Price Distributions in a Noisy Search
Equilibrium”, Journal of Economic Theory 72:1-32.
Choi, S. Y., Stahl, D. O. and Whinston, A. B. (1997) The Economics of Electronic
Commerce, Macmillan Technical Publishing,  New York.
Cox, J.C., Smith, V. L., and Walker, J. M. (1984) "Theory and Behavior of Multiple
Unit Discriminative Auctions", The Journal of Finance 34:983-1010.
Doorenbos, R. B., Etzioni, O. and Weld, D. S. (1997) “A Scaleable Comparison-
Shopping Agent for the World-Wide Web”, Proceedings of the First International
Conference on Autonomous Agents, Agents 97, Marina Del Rey, ACM.
Elofson, G. and Robinson, W. N. (1998) “Creating a Custom Mass-Production Channel
on the Internet”, Communications of the ACM 41:56-62.
Engelbrecht-Wiggans, R. (1988) "Revenue Equivalence in Multi-Object Auctions",
Economics Letters 26:15-19.
Feldman, R.A. and Mehra, R. (1993a) “Auctions: Theory and Applications”,
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 40:485-504.
Feldman, R.A. and Mehra, R. (1993b) “Auctions: A Sampling of Techniques”, Finance
and Development, September Issue:32-35.
Foner, L. N. (1997) “Yenta: A Multi-Agent, Referral-Based Matchmaking System”,
Proceedings of the First International Conference on Autonomous Agents, Agents 97,
Marina Del Rey, ACM.
23
Guttman, R. H. and Maes, P. (1998a) “Agent-mediated Integrative Negotiation for
Retail Electronic Commerce”, MIT Media Lab Paper.
Guttman, R. H. and Maes, P. (1998b) “Cooperative vs. Competitive Multi-Agent
Negotiations in Retail Electronic Commerce”,  MIT Media Lab Paper, Forthcoming in
Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents,
Paris, July 1998.*
Guttman, R. H., Moukas, R. H. and Maes, P. (1998) “Agent-Mediated Electronic
Commerce: A Survey”,  MIT Media Lab Paper, Forthcoming in Knowledge
Engineering Review, June 1998.*
Hausch, D.B. (1986) “Multi-Object Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales”
Management Science 32:1599-1610.
Kagel, J. and Roth, A. (Eds.) (1995)  Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton
University Press, Princeton, New Jersey.
Kallio, M. and Salo, S. (1993) “Competitive Equilibrium Applied to a Commodity
Exchange for Timber Trade”, Helsinki School of Economics Working Paper,
Department of Economics.
Kephart, J. O., Hanson, J. E, and Sairamesh, J. (1998) “Price-War Dynamics in a Free-
Market Economy of Software Agents”,  IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center
Working Paper.
Kersten, G. and Noronha, S. J. (1997) “Negotiation Via the World Wide Web:  A Cross-
Cultural Study of Decision Making”, IIASA Interim Report IR 97-052.**
Kersten, G. and Szpakowicz, S. (1998) “Modelling Business Negotiations for Electronic
Commerce”, IIASA Interim Report IR 98-015.**
Khoo, Li-Pheng, Tor, S. B. and Lee, S. S.G. (1998) “The Potential of Intelligent
Software Agents in the World Wide Web in Automating Part Procurement”,
International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management 34:46-52.
Korhonen, P., Oretskin, N., Teich, J., and Wallenius, J. (1995) "The Impact of a Biased
Starting Position in a Single Negotiation Text Type Mediation",  Group Decision and
Negotiation 4:357-374.
Lee, H. G. and Clark, T. H. (1997) “Market Process Reengineering through Electronic
Market Systems: Opportunities and Challenges”, Journal of MIS 13:113-136.
Lupien, W. A. and Rickard, J. T. (1997) “Crossing Network Utilizing Optimal Mutual
Satisfaction Density Profile”, United States Patent #5689652.
McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1987) “Auctions and Bidding”, Journal of Economic
Literature 25:699-738.
McAfee, R. P. and McMillan, J. (1996) “Competition and Game Theory”, Journal of
Marketing Research 33:263-267.
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. and Smith, V. L. (1990) “Auction Institutional Design:
Theory and Behavior of Simultaneous Multiple-unit Generalizations of the Dutch and
English Auctions”,  The American Economic Review 80:1276-1283.
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. and Smith, V. L. (1991a) “Smart Computer-Assisted
Markets”, Science 254:534-538.
24
McCabe, K. A., Rassenti, S. and Smith, V. L. (1991b) “Testing Vickrey's and Other
Simultaneous Multiple Unit Versions of the English Auction”, Research in
Experimental Economics 4:45-79.
Milgrom, P. (1989) “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer”, Journal of Economic
Perspectives 3:3-22.
Mongel., S.  and Roth, A.E. (1991) “Sorority Rush as a Two-Sided Matching
Mechanism”, American Economic Review 81:441-464.
Moukas, A., Guttman, R., and Maes, P. (1998) “Agent-mediated Electronic Commerce:
An MIT Media Laboratory Perspective”, MIT Media Lab Paper, Proceedings of the
First International Conference on Electronic Commerce (ICEC ‘98), Seoul, Korea,
April 1998. *
Moukas, A. and Zacharia, G. (1997) “Evolving a Multi-agent Information Filtering
Solution in Amalthaea”, Proceedings of the First International Conference on
Autonomous Agents, Agents 97, Marina Del Rey, ACM.
Mumpower, J. (1991) “The Judgment Policies of Negotiators and the Structure of
Negotiation Problems”, Management Science 37:1304-1324.
Oliver, Jim R. (1997) “A Machine-Learning Approach to Automated Negotiation and
Prospects for Electronic Commerce”, Journal of Management Information Systems
13:83-112.
Peterson, R. A., Balasubrmanian, S. and Bronnenberg, B. J. (1997) “Exploring the
Implications of the Internet for Consumer Marketing”, Journal of the Academy of
Marketing Science 25:329-346.
Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, MA.
Raiffa, H. (1996) Lectures on Negotiation Analysis, Program on Negotiation Books,
Cambridge, MA.
Roth, A. E. and Oliveira Doyomsyot, M. A. (1990) Two-sided Matching: A Study in
Game-Theoretic Modeling and Analysis, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
Rothkopf, M. H., Dougherty, E.,  and Rose, M (1986) “Comment on “Multi-Object
Auctions: Sequential vs. Simultaneous Sales”, Management Science 32:1611-1612.
Rothkopf, M. H. and Harstad, R. M. (1994) “Modeling Competitive Bidding”,
Management Science 40:364-384.
Rothkopf, M. H., Pekec, A. and Harstad, R. M. (1995) “Computationally Manageable
Combinatorial Auctions”, DIMACS Technical Report 95-09, Forthcoming in
Management Science.
Sandholm, T. and Lesser, V. (1995) “Issues in Automated Negotiation and Electronic
Commerce: Extending the Contract Net Framework”, University of Massachusetts at
Amherst, Computer Science Department Working Paper.
Schwartz, E. I. (1998) “At On-line Auctions, Good, and Raw, Deals”, New York Times,
March 5th Issue.
Schwartz, R. A. (1991) Reshaping the Equity Markets: A Guide for the 1990s, Harper
Business.
25
Smith, V.L. (1991) Papers in Experimental Economics, Cambridge University Press,
New York.
Teich, J. E, Wallenius, H. and Wallenius, J. (1998) “World-Wide-Web Technology in
Support of Negotiation and Communication”, IIASA Interim Report IR 98-018,
Forthcoming in International Journal of Technology Management.**
Teich, J. E., Wallenius, H., and Wallenius, J. (1994) "Advances in Negotiation
Science", Transactions on Operational Research  6:55-94.
Teich, J. E., Wallenius, H., Kuula, M., and Zionts, S. (1995) "A Decision Support
Approach for Negotiation With an Application To Agricultural Income Policy
Negotiations", European Journal of Operational Research 81:76-87.
Teich, J. E., Wallenius, H., Wallenius, J., and Zionts, S. (1996) "Identifying Pareto-
optimal Settlements for Two-Party Resource Allocation Negotiations", European
Journal of Operational Research 93:536-549.
Tenorio, R. (1993) "Revenue Equivalence and Bidding Behavior in a Multi-Unit
Auction Market: An Empirical Analysis", The Review of Economics and Statistics,
May:302-314.
Walker, J. S.,   Schneier B., and Jorasch, J. A.(1996) “Method and apparatus for a
cryptographically assisted commercial network system designed to facilitate buyer-
driven conditional purchase offers”, Us Patent Number 5794207.
Wellman, M.P. and Wurman, P.R. (1998) “Real Time Issues for Internet Auctions”,
First IEEE Workshop on Dependable and Real-Time E-Commerce Systems (DARE-
98), Denver, Co., USA, June 1998.
Wurman, P.R., Walsh, W.W., and Wellman, M.P. (1998) "Flexible Double Auctions for
Electronic Commerce: Theory and Implementation", University of Michigan, Artificial
Intelligence Laboratory, forthcoming in Decision Support Systems.
*Available on-line at http://ecommerce.media.mit.edu/
**Available on-line at http://www.iiasa.ac.at/ under DAS-Project.
26
